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INTRODUCTION

Social media platforms have become one of the most prevalent forms
of communication and will undoubtedly continue to be the preferred and most
pervasive form of communication worldwide.1 Social media is one of the
fastest adopted technologies, with about 4.48 billion users today.2
Approximately 56.8% of the world’s population uses some form of social
network, including 231.47 million people in the United States.3 According to
a Pew Research Center poll, Americans under fifty years old turn to digital
devices for news.4 In addition, social media serves as the primary news source
for eighteen through twenty-nine-year-olds.5 Today’s leading social media
companies are Twitter, Facebook, Google, TikTok, YouTube, and Instagram.6
Collectively, they are commonly referred to as “Big Tech.”7
The pervasiveness of information posted on these social media sites
prompted the federal government, under former President Bill Clinton, to sign
into law section 230 of the Communications Decency Act in 1996.8 The Act
served as a way for Big Tech to censor indecent material on the internet.9
After several lawsuits challenging the law’s constitutionality, section 230 was
amended in 1998 and 2018.10 Now, section 230 provides tech companies with
legal protection from civil liability for hosting the content of others and from
1.
See discussion infra Part II; Brian Dean, Social Network Usage & Growth
Statistics:
How Many People Use Social Media in 2021?, BACKLINKO,
http://backlinko.com/social-media-users (last updated Oct. 10, 2021).
2.
Dean, supra note 1.
3.
Id.
4.
Elisa Shearer, More Than Eight-in-Ten Americans Get News From Digital
Devices, PEW RSCH. CTR. (Jan. 12, 2021), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2021/01/12/more-than-eight-in-ten-americans-get-news-from-digital-devices/.
5.
See id.
6.
Dean, supra note 1; see discussion infra Section II.B.
7.
See discussion infra Section II.B.
8.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110
Stat. 133–143; see also Adi Robertson, Section 230 is 25 Years Old, and It’s Never Been More
Important, VERGE (Feb. 8, 2021, 2:08 PM), http://www.theverge.com/22268421/cda-section230-25th-anniversary-reform-stakes-big-tech-internet.
9.
See discussion infra Section II.B; Communications Decency Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133–143 (1996); Mary Graw Leary, The Indecency and
Injustice of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 41 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 553,
559 (2018).
10.
Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2017, Pub.
L. No. 115–164, § 4(a), 132 Stat. 1253, 1254 (2018); see discussion infra Section II.B; see also
47 U.S.C. § 230; Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 849 (1997) (challenging the constitutionality
of provisions of the Communications Decency Act seeking to protect minors from indecent
material posted on the internet).
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restricting access to or availability of material they deem “obscene, lewd,
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise
objectionable.”11
On May 24, 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed into law
Senate Bill 7072 (“SB 7072”), which is aimed at these Big Tech companies.12
The law comes as a response to Big Tech’s alleged bias and censorship of
conservative views, especially at the height of the 2020 election.13 Most
notable was the removal of former President Donald J. Trump from Twitter.14
According to Governor DeSantis, social media is allegedly responsible for
censoring conservative views and prioritizing “Silicon Valley leftist
narratives.”15 SB 7072 provides penalties of $250,000 a day for deplatforming
a candidate for state office and $25,000 a day for deplatforming a local
government candidate.16 SB 7072 also requires social media companies to
publish detailed standards on how it determines to deplatform and shadow ban
their users and disclosure of post-prioritization algorithms on its users.17
This Bill is the first of its kind.18 SB 7072 mirrors some of the
language in section 230 of the Communications Decency Act; however, critics
claim the law is not only preempted by the federal statute, but it goes too far.19
Others argue that the law itself is unconstitutional.20 Not even three days after
11.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(a).
12.
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); Catherine Thorbecke,
Critics Slam Florida’s Law Banning Big Tech ‘De-Platforming’ as ‘Unconstitutional’, ABC
NEWS (May 25, 2021, 4:27 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Technology/critics-slam-floridas-lawbanning-big-tech-de/story?id=77891650.
13.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see discussion infra Section II.C; Thorbecke, supra note 12.
14.
See William L. Kovacs, Section 230’s Unconstitutional Delegation of
Power
to
Big
Tech,
HILL
(Jan.
23,
2021,
6:00
PM),
http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/535497-section-230s-unconstitutional-delegation-ofpower-to-big-tech.
15.
Fox10 News, Governor Ron DeSantis Press Conference in Miami,
YOUTUBE (May 24, 2021), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=O67BF-2IWiY [hereinafter
DeSantis Press Conference].
16.
Fla. S.B. 7072.FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3) (2021).
17.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a) (2021); see discussion infra
Section III.B.1.
18.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see DeSantis Press Conference, supra note 15; Casey
Feindt, Gov. DeSantis Signs Bill Aimed at Holding ‘Big Tech’ Firms Accountable for Banning,
Blocking Accounts, FIRST COAST NEWS (May 24, 2021, 12:23 PM),
http://www.firstcoastnews.com/article/news/regional/florida/watch-governor-ron-desantisspeaks-in-miami/77-f1bd0b1e-decf-4843-9e5b-d203752d1353.
19.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–104, § 501, 110 Stat. 133–143 (1996); Complaint at 2, NetChoice, L.L.C. v. Moody, (No.
21-CV-220), 2021 WL 2690876, at 2 [hereinafter NetChoice Complaint]; 47 U.S.C. §
230(c)(2)(a).
20.
Thorbecke, supra note 12.
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Governor DeSantis signed the Bill into law, NetChoice and Computer and
Communications Industry Association (“CCIA”), two large not-for-profit
trade associations whose members include social-media providers, filed suit
in federal court challenging the Bill’s constitutionality and seeking to enjoin
its enforcement.21 SB 7072 was to take effect July 1, 2021; however, on June
30, 2021, a Federal Judge granted CCIA’s preliminary injunction.22 This Note
will explore the constitutionality of SB 7072.23 Part II will discuss the events
that led to the drafting of the Bill, Part III will describe its contents, and Part
IV will explore whether SB 7072 is constitutional.24
II.
A.

EVENTS THAT LED TO SENATE BILL 7072

Marketplace for Ideas

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states,
“[C]ongress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press . . . .”25 The Supreme Court has classified certain types of speech, like
political speech, as warranting more protection than others.26 A regulation
that directly infringes on political speech will only be upheld if the
government meets the high burden of showing that the law is “narrowly
tailored to [achieve] a compelling [government] interest.”27 Classifications of

21.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Jordan Kirkland, DeSantis’s “Big Tech” Crackdown
Bill Slapped with Free Speech Lawsuit, CAPITOLIST (May 28, 2021),
http://thecapitolist.com/desantiss-big-tech-crackdown-bill-slapped-with-free-speech-lawsuit/.
22.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see Renzo Downey, Judge Blocks Florida Law Aimed at
Punishing Social Media, FLA. POL. (July 1, 2021), http://floridapolitics.com/archives/438675judge-halts-big-tech-bill-hours-before-it-kicks-in/.
23.
See discussion infra Part IV; Fla. S.B. 7072.
24.
See discussion infra Parts II–V; Fla. S.B. 7072.
25.
U.S. CONST. amend. I.
26.
See, e.g., W. Va. State Bd. Of Educ. V. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943)
(finding a school board resolution that required students to salute the American flag during
activity programs in all public schools unconstitutional because it compelled involuntary
speech).
27.
See Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2231–32 (2015) (striking
down a town ordinance that restricted the postage of certain signs because the government’s
purpose for the regulation, which was aesthetic appeal and traffic management, was not a
compelling reason and the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to achieve the government’s
purpose, thus failing the strict scrutiny standard applied).
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speech such as obscenity,28 fighting words,29 true threats,30 incitement to
violence,31 and defamation,32 on the other hand, are considered low-value
speech that does not receive the same heightened legal protection as political
speech.33 Laws that regulate these lower-level categories of speech will be
upheld if they are rationally related to a legitimate interest,34 or sometimes,
upon a showing that the law is substantially related to an important state
interest.35
The high protection of political speech evinces the Founding Fathers’
aversion to tyrannical British regulations on expression, such as the licensing
laws that plagued the sixteenth century.36 These were followed by
prosecutions for seditious libel in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth
centuries.37 With the advent of the printing press in the sixteenth century,
licensing laws sought to punish those who published material criticizing the
King.38 Licensing in the colonies was considered inconsistent with freedom
of expression and was interpreted as prior restraints on speech.39 According
to one commentator, “since licensing schemes had expired in England in 1695
and in the colonies by 1725, the Framers of the First Amendment intended to
28.
See, e.g., Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
29.
See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942). The
Supreme Court found that the First Amendment does not protect “fighting words” — words
that are “likely to provoke the average person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the
peace.” Id. at 574.
30.
See, e.g., Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003). “True threats” occur
when the speaker “means to communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of
unlawful violence to a particular individual or group of individuals.” Id. Not to be confused
with “political hyperbole.” Id.
31.
See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
32.
See, e.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279–80 (1964)
(requiring the showing of actual malice to prove the publication was defamatory against a public
official). Depending on who the speech was intended for, like a public official, the Supreme
Court requires different levels of intent to prove that the statement was defamatory. Id.
33.
VICTORIA L. KILLION, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11072, THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: CATEGORIES OF SPEECH 1–2 (2019).
34.
See, e.g., Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 8 (1974) (upholding a
village zoning ordinance under the rational basis standard that restricted land use to a family
dwelling).
35.
See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 662 (1994). This
is the intermediate scrutiny standard, which the Court uses when a classification based on
gender or legitimacy is involved. Id.
36.
See RONALD J. KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., THE FIRST AMENDMENT: CASES
& THEORY 5–6 (3d ed. Wolters Kluwer 2017).
37.
Id. at 6–7. These prosecutions were much like those involving libel of
private persons. Id. at 7.
38.
Id. at 5–6.
39.
See id. at 9.
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do more than simply prohibit prior restraints.”40 Colonial defenders of free
expression, like Thomas Jefferson, argued that free debate would lead to
truth.41 The learned John Stuart Mill knew the value of truth and the
importance of expressing one’s views in an open marketplace for ideas:
[T]he peculiar evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that
it is robbing the human race; posterity as well as the existing
generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more who hold
it. If the opinion is right, they are deprived of the opportunity of
exchanging error for truth: if wrong, they lose, what is almost as
great a benefit, the clearer perception and livelier impression of
truth produced by its collision with error.42

Essentially, the free marketplace fosters debate and the exchange of
ideas in pursuit of the truth.43 According to Thomas Jefferson, “[t]ruth . . .
will prevail if left to herself. . . . [S]he is the proper and sufficient antagonist
to error, and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless by human
interposition disarmed of her natural weapons, free argument, and debate.”44
Today’s marketplace for ideas has changed from the public square to virtual
platforms.45 These virtual platforms provide avenues for historically

1950).

40.
41.

KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, at 9.
Id. at 13–14; 2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 546 (Julian P. Boyd ed.,

42.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 87 (David Bromwich & George Kateb
eds., Yale Univ. Press 2003) (1859).
43.
See Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes J.,
dissenting).

Id.

Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logical.
If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with
all your heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all
opposition. To allow opposition by speech seems to indicate that you think the
speech impotent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that you do
not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many fighting faiths,
they may come to believe even more than they believe the very foundations of their
conduct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in ideas —
that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the
competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their wishes
safely can be carried out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an
experiment, as all life is an experiment. Every year if not every day we have to
wager our salvation upon some prophesy based upon imperfect knowledge.

44.
KROTOSZYNSKI, JR. ET AL., supra note 36, at 13–14.
45.
See Mason C. Shefa, First Amendment 2.0: Revisiting Marsh and the
Quasi-Public Forum in the Age of Social Media, 41 U. HAW. L. REV. 159, 161–62 (2018).
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unprecedented amounts of speech.46 Never has material traveled so quickly
and reached so many people.47 Also unprecedented, however, is the
concentrated control of so much speech in the hands of a few private parties.48
B.

Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act

In Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co.,49 the plaintiff sued
Prodigy, an interactive computer service, for defamatory comments made by
an unidentified third party on one of Prodigy’s bulletin boards.50 The New
York court held Prodigy strictly liable for the defamatory post because
Prodigy acted more like an original publisher than a distributor.51 Original
publishers of defamatory statements are held strictly liable for any defamatory
information they publish.52 On the other hand, distributors like book stores
and libraries are held to a lower knowledge standard, in which liability is
imposed on the distributor of defamatory statements if it is proven that the
distributor knew of the statement’s defamatory nature.53 The Stratton
Oakmont court found that Prodigy was acting more akin to a publisher because
it advertised its practice of controlling content on its service and because it
actively screened and edited messages posted on its bulletin boards.54
Congress enacted section 230 of the Communications Decency Act to
remove the disincentives to self-regulate created by the Stratton Oakmont
decision.55 Under the court’s decision, interactive computer services would
be opening themselves to liability for regulating the material posted on their
platforms because such regulation casts the service provider in the role of a
publisher.56 Congress, recognizing the importance of the Internet’s continued
growth and the need to regulate indecent online material, drafted section 230
of the Communications Decency Act codified in Title V of the
46.
See id. at 164. (“[A]s early as 2001, courts have treated computers and
Internet access as ‘virtually indispensable in the modern world of communications and
information gathering.’”) (quoting United States v. Peterson, 248 F.3d 79, 83 (2d Cir. 2001)
(per curiam)).
47.
See id. at 165.
48.
See id. at 161–62.
49.
1995 WL 323710 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 24, 1995).
50.
Id. at *1–*2.
51.
Id. at *4.
52.
See id. at *3.
53.
Id.; see also Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
54.
Stratton Oakmont, Inc., 1995 WL 323710, at *4.
55.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230; John A. LoNigro, Comment, Deplatformed: Social
Network Censorship, the First Amendment, and the Argument to Amend Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act, 37 TOURO L. REV. 427, 459–60 (2021); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
56.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331.
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Telecommunications Act of 1996.57 Nebraska Senator James Exon and
Washington State Senator Slade Gorton introduced section 230 to the Senate
Committee of Commerce, Science, and Transportation in 1995.58 According
to Senator Exon, the Act’s purpose was to “provide much needed protection
for children” from indecent material posted on the Internet.59 The Act
prohibits the knowing dissemination of obscene material to children and
empowers “interactive computer service[s]” to remove such content from their
platforms without risk of liability.60 “‘Interactive computer service’ [is
defined as] any information service, system, or access software provider that
provides or enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server,
including specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet
and such systems operated or services offered by libraries or educational
institutions.”61 This definition includes social media networks.62 Thus,
Twitter, Instagram, Google, YouTube, and Facebook are all covered under
section 230.63
1.

Policy Goals

The Act’s policy is explicitly outlined in the text, and provides that it
is the policy of the United States:
(1) to promote the continued development of the Internet
and other interactive computer services and other interactive media;
(2) to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer
services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation; (3) to encourage
the development of technologies which maximize user control over
what information is received by individuals, families, and schools
who use the Internet and other interactive computer services; (4) to
remove disincentives for the development and utilization of
57.
Communications Decency Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104–104, § 501, 110
Stat. 133–143 (1996); Leary, supra note 9, at 558–59.
58.
Senator
J.
James
Exon,
CONGRESS.GOV,
http://www.congress.gov/member/john-exon/E000284?r=2&q=%7B%22billstatus%22%3A%22introduced%22%7D (last visited Jan. 10, 2022); S.314, 104th Cong. (1st
Sess. 1995).
59.
See Leary, supra note 9, at 559 n.19 (quoting Senator Exon, author of the
CDA) (“The fundamental purpose of the Communications Decency Act is to provide much
needed protection for children.”).
60.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c).
61.
Id. § 230(f)(2).
62.
See LoNigro, supra note 55, at 457–58.
63.
See id.
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blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict
their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online
material; and (5) to ensure vigorous enforcement of Federal
criminal laws to deter and punish trafficking in obscenity, stalking,
and harassment by means of computer.64

The Act was first struck down in Reno v. American Civil Liberties
Union65 in 1997 when the Supreme Court held that portions of the Act were
unconstitutionally vague.66 For instance, the Act’s prohibition of the
“transmission of ‘indecent material’” was specifically found to be vague.67
However, the Act itself was not challenged, and remains effective law today.68
2.

Publisher vs. Distributor

Section 230 explicitly exempts interactive computer services as
“publishers of information” posted on their platforms by third parties.69 This
designation came as a response to the Stratton Oakmont decision.70 One year
after section 230 was enacted, the Fourth Circuit dealt with the publisher
versus distributor distinction in Zeran v. American Online, Inc.71 The plaintiff,
Zeran, sued AOL for failing to remove defamatory messages posted by an
unidentified third party, failing to screen for similar posts thereafter, and
refusing to post retractions of those messages.72 Zeran argued that Congress’
chosen designation, to explicitly treat interactive service providers as
publishers, means that they did not mean to limit distributor liability by
exclusion.73 Therefore, because AOL knew of the defamatory nature of the
posts, they should be held liable as distributors.74
The Fourth Circuit disagreed, reasoning that “imposition of
distributor liability . . . is merely a subset, or a species, of publisher liability,
and is therefore also foreclosed by [section] 230.”75 The distinction between
publishers and distributors is important because section 230 has granted social
64.
47 U.S.C. § 230(b).
65.
521 U.S. 844 (1997); see also Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
66.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 874; Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
67.
Reno, 521 U.S. at 870–74; Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
68.
Leary, supra note 9, at 559.
69.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1).
70.
LoNigro, supra note 55, at 464.
71.
129 F.3d 327 (4th Cir. 1997); see also Leary, supra note 9, at 575.
72.
Zeran, 129 F.3d at 328.
73.
Id. at 331. Zeran notified AOL “repeatedly” about the defamatory posts.
Id. at 329. Thus, the Company was on notice. See id.
74.
See id. at 331.
75.
Id. at 332.
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media platforms free reign to remove content they otherwise find
objectionable without being classified as a publisher of such editorial
choices.76 As such, Big Tech companies are immune from civil liability.77
C.

2020 Election

With more Americans turning to social media for their daily news, it
is no surprise that political candidates have relied so heavily on these virtual
platforms.78 Social media platforms are amenable to political candidates’
messages because of their capacity to reach a vast amount of people.79 The
2020 election was unprecedented in that it occurred in the middle of a
pandemic, where the majority of Americans were forced to stay at home and
connect with people via social media.80 Political ads on these social networks
were an essential tool used by 2020 candidates to reach voters throughout their
campaigns.81
While political ads that run on broadcast television remain the largest
expenditure, online political ads are not far behind.82 From 2018 through
2019, former President Donald J. Trump spent the most money of all online
ad-spenders and more on Google and Facebook political advertisements than
every other 2020 candidate.83 Former President Trump spent approximately
$852,000 on Facebook advertisements, which surpassed every other

76.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A).
77.
See id. at § 230(e). The only exceptions to the liability shield granted to
Big Tech companies is if they violate a criminal law, violate intellectual property laws, or
violate sex trafficking laws. Id. at § 230(e)(1)–(5).
78.
See LoNigro, supra note 55, at 429.
79.
See Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730, 1735 (2017) (“While
in the past there may have been difficulty in identifying the most important places — in a spatial
sense — for the exchange of views, today the answer is clear. It is cyberspace — the ‘vast
democratic forums of the Internet’ in general, and social media in particular.”) (citation
omitted).
80.
See Miles Parks, Social Media Usage Is at an All-Time High. That Could
Mean a Nightmare for Democracy, NPR (May 27, 2020, 5:02 AM),
http://www.npr.org/2020/05/27/860369744/social-media-usage-is-at-an-all-time-high-thatcould-mean-a-nightmare-for-democr.
81.
See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, 2020 Presidential Election and the Media –
Statistics & Facts, STATISTA (Feb. 25, 2021), http://www.statista.com/topics/5934/2020presidential-election-and-the-media/.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.

2021]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA

39

candidate’s spending.84 Twitter85 and TikTok86 currently prohibit political
ads, but Facebook does not.87 While these amounts may seem staggering to
the average person, to a political candidate, they are essential to reach the
voters.88 For instance, every 2020 presidential candidate had a Twitter
account.89 One of the Democratic candidates in the 2020 presidential race,
Bernie Sanders, had over ten million followers on Twitter, while President Joe
Biden had over four million.90 Former President Trump had nearly 88.9
million followers before he was banned from Twitter on January 7, 2021.91
Former President Trump’s use of Twitter was widely criticized, and according
to a poll mid-way through his presidency, sixty percent of the pollsters
claimed his Tweets were inappropriate.92
Whatever the content of his tweets, former President Trump was able
to speak directly to his millions of followers and skip the middleman of
mainstream news that would require one to sift through and interpret what the
former President “meant.”93 In fact, he was not the only politician to see the

84.
Id.
85.
Political Content, TWITTER BUS., http://business.twitter.com/en/help/adspolicies/ads-content-policies/political-content.html (last visited Jan. 10, 2022) (“Twitter
globally prohibits the promotion of political content. . . . [w]e define political content as content
that references a candidate, political party, elected or appointed government official, . . .
referendum, ballot measure, legislation, regulation, directive, or judicial outcome.”).
86.
Blake Chandlee, Understanding Our Policies Around Paid Ads, TIKTOK
NEWSROOM, http://newsroom.tiktok.com/en-us/understanding-our-policies-around-paid-ads,
(last visited Jan. 10, 2022) (“[W]e will not allow paid ads that promote or oppose a candidate,
current leader, political party or group, or issue at the federal, state, or local level — including
election-related ads, advocacy ads, or issue ads.”).
87.
See Get Authorized to Run Ads About Social Issues, Elections or Politics,
FACEBOOK
FOR
BUS.,
http://www.facebook.com/business/help/208949576550051?id=288762101909005
(last
visited Jan. 10, 2022) [hereinafter Get Authorized to Run Ads] (requiring advertisers that wish
to run or edit political ads on Facebook in the United States to get special authorization first).
88.
See Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
89.
See Bridget Coyne, Helping Identify 2020 U.S. Election Candidates on
Twitter,
TWITTER:
BLOG
(Dec.
12,
2019),
http://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2019/helping-identify-2020-us-electioncandidates-on-twitter (noting that all presidential candidates that have been confirmed by
Ballotopia will have Election Labels — the blue checks — next to their name).
90.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
91.
Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, BBC NEWS,
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-55597840 (last visited Jan. 10, 2022).
92.
Statista Rsch. Dep’t, supra note 81.
93.
See Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91;
Brice C. Barnard, Comment, The Tweet Stops Here: Politicians Must Address Emerging
Freedom of Speech Issues in Social Media, 88 UMKC L. REV. 1019, 1025 (2020).
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value in speaking directly to his constituency.94 President Biden relied heavily
on social media networks, especially to connect with younger voters.95
D.

Deplatforming of Candidates

Claims of Big Tech’s censorship have recently come to the forefront
of the news.96 Because of section 230’s protection, these companies do not
risk civil liability for removing content posted on their platforms that violate
their “terms of service.”97 Algorithms, which automate the detection of
“misinformation” and violations of these platforms’ terms of services, enable
Big Tech to remove content, usually without warning and without a clear
explanation of the standards that resulted in the removal.98 Although
technically not state actors, Big Tech companies have amassed such a large
base and influence that they should be held to the same degree of scrutiny as
government actors.99 The fact that a few private companies essentially have
an editorial monopoly over the vast amount of content posted on their sites is
contrary to the principles of the Constitution.100 Ostensibly, these social media
sites should serve to foster more speech.101 Big Tech’s censorship of certain
viewpoints was evident throughout the 2020 election.102

94.
See Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91; Peter
Suciu, Social Media Proved Crucial for Joe Biden — It Allowed Him to Connect with Young
Voters and Avoid His Infamous Gaffes, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2020, 4:35 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/petersuciu/2020/11/17/social-media-proved-crucial-for-joebiden--it-allowed-him-to-connect-with-young-voters-and-avoid-his-infamousgaffes/?sh=b49856841482.
95.
Suciu, supra note 94.
96.
See, e.g., How Big Tech Censorship is Harming Free Speech, LIBERTIES
(May 5, 2021), http://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/big-tech-censorship/43511.
97.
LoNigro, supra note 55, at 431; Twitter Terms of Service, TWITTER,
http://twitter.com/en/tos (last visited Jan. 10, 2022). Under its terms of service, Twitter can
“suspend or terminate your account or cease providing you with all or part of the [s]ervices at
any time for any or no reason . . . .” Id.
98.
See How Big Tech Censorship is Harming Free Speech, supra note 96.
99.
See, e.g., Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 506 (1946) (finding companyowned town was subject to the First Amendment because town was open to the public and used
for public purposes, similar to the government); see LoNigro, supra note 55, at 429.
100.
See discussion supra Section II.A; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
101.
See 47 U.S.C. § 230.
102.
See discussion infra Section II.D.1; Carla Marinucci & Daniel Strauss,
Tulsi Gabbard Sues Google Over Post-Debate Ad Suspension, POLITICO (July 25, 2019, 1:35
PM),
http://www.politico.com/story/2019/07/25/tulsi-gabbard-sues-google-accountsuspension-1435405.
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Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard

The 2020 Democratic Party presidential candidate, Tulsi Gabbard of
Hawaii, fell victim to Big Tech’s censorship during her campaign.103
Throughout her campaign, Representative Gabbard was critical of Big
Tech.104 Gabbard frequently voiced her concern about Facebook banning
users and voiced her support for net neutrality as a “cornerstone of our
democracy.”105 Right after the Democratic presidential debate in June 2019,
Google suspended Gabbard’s campaign ad account.106 Only hours after the
debate, Gabbard’s performance earned her the title of one of Google’s most
searched candidates.107 It was never proven why her campaign ad account
was suspended at such a critical time.108 Gabbard only received a message
from Google that said her account was suspended “for violations of billing
practices and advertising practices.”109 In July 2019, Representative Gabbard
filed suit against Google, claiming they violated her First Amendment right of
free speech by suspending her campaign account.110 In a short decision, the
court dismissed the case, finding Google was not a state actor and, therefore,
not subject to the First Amendment.111
Representative Gabbard is not the only political official who faced
Big Tech’s censorship.112 On September 13, 2019, Twitter suspended
Republican Texas House Representative Briscoe Cain’s account for one
103.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102; see LoNigro, supra note 55, at 430.
104.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102.
105.
Id.
106.
Id.
107.
Id.
108.
See id.
109.
Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102.
110.
See id.; Tulsi Now, Inc. v. Google, LLC, No. 2:19-CV-06444, 2020 WL
4353686 at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 2020).
111.
Tulsi Now, Inc., 2020 WL 4353686 at *2.

Id.

What Plaintiff fails to establish is how Google’s regulation of its own
platform is in any way equivalent to a governmental regulation of an election.
Google does not hold primaries, it does not select candidates, and it does not prevent
anyone from running for office or voting in election. To the extent Google
“regulates” anything, it regulates its own private speech and platform.

112.
See Marinucci & Strauss, supra note 102; Joseph Menn & Katie Paul,
Twitter, Facebook Suspend Some Accounts as U.S. Election Misinformation Spreads Online,
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2020, 5:08 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-electionsocialmedia/twitter-facebook-suspend-some-accounts-as-u-s-election-misinformationspreads-online-idUSKBN27J2S4 (“Twitter, Inc.[] and Facebook, Inc.[] on Tuesday suspended
several recently created and mostly right-leaning news accounts posting information about
voting in the hotly contested U.S. election for violating their policies.”).
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hundred forty-one days.113 On January 17, 2021, Twitter suspended
Republican House Representative Marjorie Taylor Greene for twelve hours.114
On June 11, 2021, Republican Senator Ron Johnson was suspended from
YouTube for seven days,115 and on January 9, 2021, Republican House
Representative Barry Moore’s Twitter account was suspended temporarily.116
2.

Former President Donald J. Trump

During his presidency, former President Trump was also critical of
Big Tech and called for the policing of section 230.117 On May 28, 2020,
President Trump issued an Executive Order (“EO”) that commented on the
selective censorship that Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube were
exercising over Americans.118 One of the directives in the EO ordered the
Department of Justice to develop proposed amendments to section 230 that
113.
Dave Montgomery & Nick Corsaniti, Exchange Over Texas Ballot’s
‘Purity’ Puts G.O.P. Firebrand in Hot Seat, N.Y. TIMES, May 13, 2021, at A19; Texas Tribune
Staff, Briscoe Cain Says His “My AR is Ready For You” Tweet Benefited Him, Beto O’Rouke,
TEXAS TRIB. (Sept. 28, 2019, 3:00 PM), http://www.texastribune.org/2019/09/28/briscoe-cainbeto-orourke-gun-tweet/ (discussing how Republican Representative Briscoe Gain’s Twitter
account was suspended after he tweeted an alleged death threat towards Democratic presidential
candidate Beto O’Rourke).
114.
Bill Chappell, Twitter Suspends Rep. Marjorie Taylor Greene's Account,
NPR
(Jan.
17,
2021),
http://www.npr.org/sections/insurrection-at-thecapitol/2021/01/17/957891462/twitter-suspends-rep-marjorie-taylor-greene-s-accounttemporarily; Twitter Suspends Republican Lawmaker’s Account Over Violations of ‘Integrity
Policy’,
KOREA
TIMES,
http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/tech/2021/09/133_302634.html?KK (Jan. 18, 2021, 1:48
PM) (explaining how Representative Greene’s account was suspended for tweeting about
alleged 2020 election fraud, which was in violation of Twitter’s civic integrity policy).
115.
Shawn Johnson, Republican US Sen. Ron Johnson Suspended from
YouTube, WIS. PUB. RADIO (June 11, 2021, 5:50 PM), http://www.wpr.org/republican-us-senron-johnson-suspended-youtube (discussing how Senator Johnson was suspended for
“violat[ing] the company’s [COVID-19] medical misinformation [policy]”).
116.
See Zack Budryk, Newly Sworn in GOP Rep Deletes Twitter Account After
Suspension Following Controversial Riot Posts, HILL (Jan. 11, 2021, 11:52 AM),
http://thehill.com/homenews/house/533625-newly-sworn-in-gop-rep-deletes-twitter-accountafter-suspension-following; Barry Moore Deactivates Twitter Account After Being Suspended
From Platform, ALA. NEWS NETWORK, http://www.alabamanews.net/2021/01/11/barry-mooredeactivates-twitter-account-after-being-suspended-from-platform/ (Jan. 11, 2021, 3:04 PM)
(discussing how House Representative Moore’s Twitter account was suspended after tweets he
shared following the riot at the U.S. Capitol).
117.
Talia Kaplan, Trump Lawsuit Against Big Tech Could ‘Break New Ground’
on First Amendment Protections: Parler Interim CEO, FOX NEWS (July 8, 2021),
http://www.foxnews.com/media/trump-lawsuit-big-tech-first-amendment-parler-ceo;
see
Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079 (May 28, 2020).
118.
See Exec. Order No. 13,925, 85 Fed. Reg. 34,079.
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would promote the policy goals outlined within the EO.119 One of those goals
was the “commitment to free and open debate on the internet” because it is
“essential to sustaining our democracy.”120
On January 8, 2021, Twitter permanently banned President Trump’s
account.121 Following the United States Capitol protest—turned riot by
fringed far-right members—on January 6, 2021, Twitter decided to
permanently disable the President’s account.122 Twitter initially locked
President Trump’s account citing that “the risks of keeping his commentary
live on its site [were] too high.”123 The company told former President Trump
that he would be allowed back onto his account, provided he remove the
offending posts.124 After removing the posts that allegedly violated Twitter’s
policies, former President Trump was reinstated onto the site.125 Shortly after
being reinstated, the former President posted two tweets: one calling his

119.
See id. (“Free speech is the bedrock of American democracy. Our
Founding Fathers protected this sacred right with the First Amendment to the Constitution. The
freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as a free people.”).
120.
Id. The Department of Justice hosted a “Public Workshop,” a private
“Expert Roundtable” discussion and “Industry Listening Sessions” where “the Department met
individually with a diverse group of businesses that had attended the public event or otherwise
expressed interest in Section 230.” Department of Justice’s Review of Section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act of 1996, U.S. DEPT. OF JUST. ARCHIVES,
http://www.justice.gov/archives/ag/department-justice-s-review-section-230-communicationsdecency-act-1996 (last visited Dec. 29, 2021) (“[These meetings] were private and confidential
to foster frank discussions about their use of Section 230 [of the Communications Decency Act
of 1996] . . . .”).
121.
Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, TWITTER: BLOG (Jan. 8,
2021), http://blog.twitter.com/en_us/topics/company/2020/suspension.
122.
Id.; see also Kate Conger & Mike Isaac, Twitter Permanently Bans Trump,
Capping Online Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, http://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/08/technology/twittertrump-suspended.html (last updated Jan. 12, 2021).
123.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122. The events that led to Former President
Trump’s first temporary suspension resulted from a rally held on the White House Ellipse,
where the former President said:
Now it is up to Congress to confront this egregious assault on our democracy, and
after this, we’re gonna walk down and I’ll be there with you. We’re gonna walk
down . . . to the Capitol and we’re gonna cheer on our brave Senators and
Congressmen and women and we’ll probably not gonna be cheering so much for
some of them because you’ll never take back our country with weakness. You have
to show strength, and you have to be strong.

NBC News, Trump Encourages Those at His Rally to March to the Capitol NBC News NOW,
YOUTUBE
(Jan.
7,
2021),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=5fiT6c0MQ58&ab_channel=NBCNews.
124.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
125.
Id.
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supporters “American Patriots” and another informing his followers that he
would not be attending President Joe Biden’s inauguration.126
Twitter found these tweets to condone the United States Capitol riot
and claimed that the President was inciting violence.127 A Twitter employee
told the Washington Post that a petition signed by hundreds of employees
asked the company to immediately remove President Trump’s account.128
After a meeting, Twitter stood by its decision and permanently banned the
President from its platform.129 Facebook, Snapchat, YouTube, and Reddit
followed suit and limited the President’s access to their platforms as well.130
Both Twitter and Facebook have decided to maintain their ban on the
former President.131 As a result, on July 7, 2021, President Trump filed a class
action lawsuit in Federal court challenging Twitter’s unilateral decision to ban
him from its platform.132 The lawsuit alleges that the Tech giant violated his
First Amendment right to free speech.133 As a way around the lack of state
action that has already been alleged by various suits challenging Big Tech’s
censorship,134 Trump claims that Twitter has been “engag[ing] in
impermissible censorship resulting from . . . legislative action, a misguided
reliance upon [s]ection 230 of the Communications Decency Act . . . and
willful participation in joint activity with federal actors.”135 Twitter’s status,
the lawsuit goes on to say, “rises beyond that of a private company to that of
a state actor, and as such, [Twitter] is constrained by the First Amendment

126.
Id. (“In one, he wrote: ‘The 75,000,000 great American Patriots who voted
for me, AMERICA FIRST, and MAKE AMERICA GREAT AGAIN, will have a GIANT
VOICE long into the future. They will not be disrespected or treated unfairly in any way, shape
or form!!!’”); Twitter ‘Permanently Suspends’ Trump’s Account, supra note 91.
127.
See Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, supra note 121.
128.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
129.
Permanent Suspension of @realDonaldTrump, supra note 121.
130.
Conger & Isaac, supra note 122.
131.
See Haley Messenger, Twitter to Uphold Permanent Ban Against Trump,
Even
if
He
Were
to
Run
for
Office
Again,
NBC
NEWS,
http://www.nbcnews.com/business/business-news/twitter-uphold-permanent-ban-againsttrump-even-if-he-were-n1257269 (last updated Feb. 10, 2021, 10:36 AM); Facebook’s Trump
Ban Upheld by Oversight Board for Now, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.com/news/technology56985583 (last updated May 25, 2021).
132.
Complaint at 1–2, Trump v. Twitter, Inc., 21-CV-22441 (S.D. Fla. July 7,
2021) [hereinafter Trump Complaint].
133.
Id. at 3.
134.
See, e.g., Prager Univ. v. Google LLC, 951 F.3d 991, 999 (9th Cir. 2020)
(“Because the state action doctrine precludes constitutional scrutiny of YouTube’s content
moderation pursuant to its Terms of Service and Community Guidelines, we affirm the District
Court’s dismissal of PragerU’s First Amendment claim.”).
135.
Trump Complaint, supra note 132, at 2.
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right to free speech in the censorship decisions it makes.”136 This arm of the
government argument has not been alleged in any suit against Big Tech
companies before, and we will have to wait to see if it will be successful.137
As a result of these events, on May 24, 2021, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis
signed into law SB 7072.138 With the midterm elections just a year away, it is
no surprise that the Governor does not want to be the next victim of Big Tech’s
censorship and thus fashioned a law that would monetarily affect Big Tech’s
decision to deplatform a candidate.139
III.

SENATE BILL 7072

The impetus for SB 7072 was to hold Big Tech accountable for
silencing dissent and certain viewpoints that were not consistent with “the
dominant Silicon Valley ideology.”140 Lieutenant Governor of Florida,
Jeanette Nuñez, commented that “by signing SB 7072 into law, Florida is
taking back the virtual public square as a place where information and ideas
can flow freely.”141 The Governor went on to note that many of Florida’s
constituents have had experience living in countries where speech is silenced,
specifically in Venezuela and Cuba.142 Florida Senator Ray Rodrigues, one of
the co-sponsors of the bill, said that “[r]equiring Big Tech to define the
behaviors that will lead to someone being deplatformed is a significant victory
for free speech . . . .”143

136.
Id.
137.
See Kaplan, supra note 117.
138.
S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2021); see DeSantis Press
Conference, supra note 15.
139.
See discussion infra Part III; Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, RON DESANTIS 46TH GOVERNOR OF FLA. (May 24, 2021),
http://www.flgov.com/2021/05/24/governor-ron-desantis-signs-bill-to-stop-the-censorship-offloridians-by-big-tech/; Dan Trujillo, DeSantis Running for Re-election and Not Considering
Presidential Run, Governor Announces, WFTS ABC ACTION NEWS (Oct. 1, 2021, 2:18 PM),
http://www.abcactionnews.com/news/state/desantis-running-for-re-election-and-notconsidering-presidential-run-governor-announces.
140.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139 (“A social media platform may not take any action to censor,
deplatform, or shadow ban a journalistic enterprise based on the content of its publication or
broadcast.”); see also Fla. S.B. 7072
141.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also Fla. S.B. 7072.
142.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139.
143.
Id.
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SB 7072 creates three new Florida Statutes: section 106.072, section 287.137,
and section 501.2041.144 Under SB 7072, all Floridians, not just political
candidates, will be able to directly sue companies that violate the law and seek
monetary damages.145 The bill enables the Attorney General of Florida to
bring an action against Big Tech for violating the law under Florida’s Unfair
and Deceptive Practices Act.146 Violations of antitrust laws will also enable
the Attorney General to bring an action against the technology companies, and
will result in these companies being added to an “antitrust violator vendor
list.”147 Being placed on the antitrust violator vendor list will affect these
companies’ ability to receive government contracts.148 Finally, the law
imposes monetary repercussions with fees of up to $250,000 a day for state
and local offices deplatforming political candidates.149
A.

Section 2
1.

Removing Candidates

Section 2 of SB 7072 is entitled: “Social media deplatforming of
political candidates.”150 Under this section, “‘[d]eplatform’ has the same
meaning as [it does] in [Florida Statute section] 501.2041,” which defines
“[d]eplatform” as “the action or practice by a social media platform to
permanently delete or ban a user or to temporarily delete or ban a user from
the social media platform for more than [fourteen] days.”151 Social media
platform is defined as:
[A]ny information service, system, Internet search engine, or access
software provider that: [p]rovides or enables computer access by
144.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2021); FLA. STAT. § 287.137 (2021);
FLA. STAT. § 501.2041 (2021); NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876,
at *2 (N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
145.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6); Fla. S.B. 7072.
146.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also Fla S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041.
147.
Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the Censorship of Floridians by
Big Tech, supra note 139; see also FLA. STAT. § 287.137(2)(a)–(b).
148.
FLA. STAT. § 287.137(2)(a)–(b) (“A public entity may not accept a bid,
proposal, or reply from, award a new contract to, or transact new business with any person or
affiliate on the antitrust violator vendor list . . . .”).
149.
FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3); Governor Ron DeSantis Signs Bill to Stop the
Censorship of Floridians by Big Tech, supra note 139.
150.
Fla. S.B. 7072 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 106.072 (2021)).
151.
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(c) (2021).

2021]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA

47

multiple users to a computer server; . . . [o]perates as a sole
proprietorship, partnership, limited liability company, corporation,
association; . . . [d]oes business in the [S]tate [of Florida], and
[either] [h]as annual gross revenues in excess of $100 million . . .
[or] [h]as at least 100 million monthly individual platform
participants . . . .152

The definition of “social media platform” explicitly exempts “any
information service, system, Internet search engine, or access software
provider operated by a company that owns and operates a theme park or
entertainment complex . . . .”153
Section 2 goes on to prohibit the willful deplatforming of “a candidate
for office who is known by the social media platform to be a candidate,
beginning on the date of qualification and ending on the date of the election
or the date the candidate ceases to be a candidate.”154 As noted above,
violating section 2 of SB 7072 may result in “the social media platform [being]
fined $250,000 per day for a candidate for statewide office and $25,000 per
day for a candidate for other offices.”155 Section 2 also states that any willful
free advertising provided by the social media platform must be disclosed to
the candidate.156 Explicitly in section 2 is a provision that states the law “may
only be enforced to the extent not inconsistent with federal law and 47 U.S.C.
§ 230(e)(3) . . . .” otherwise known as the Communications Decency Act.157
B.

Section 4

Section 4 of the bill, which creates Florida Statute section 501.2041,
is entitled: “Unlawful acts and practices by social media platforms.”158
Section 4 provides that “[a] social media platform that fails to comply with
any of the provisions of this subsection commits an unfair or deceptive . . .
practice . . . .”159

152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(2).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(3).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(4).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 106.072(5); see also 47 U.S.C. § 230.
Fla. S.B. 7072 (codified as FLA. STAT. § 501.2041 (2021)).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2).
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Censor, Shadow Ban, and Use of Post-Prioritization Algorithms

Section 4 prohibits any social media platform from “censor[ing]” or
“shadow ban[ning] a user’s content . . . or deplatform[ing] a [candidate],”
without first notifying them of the action taken against them.160 “Shadow ban”
is defined in this section to be “action by a social media platform . . . to limit
or eliminate the exposure of a user or content or material posted by a user to
other users of the social media platform.”161 “Censor” is also defined in
section 4 to include “any action taken by a social media platform to delete,
regulate, restrict, edit, alter, inhibit the publication or republication of, suspend
a right to post, remove, or post an addendum to any content or material posted
by a user.”162
Any use of “post-prioritization,” which is “action by the social media
platform to place, feature, or prioritize certain content or material ahead of,
below, or in a more or less prominent position than others in a newsfeed, feed,
or search results,” is also prohibited against any political candidate.163 The
social media platform must allow “user[s] to opt-out of post-prioritization and
shadow ban[] algorithms . . . .”164 These platforms must also provide an annual
notice to users on the use of such algorithms and shadow banning and to
reoffer the opt-out opportunity annually.165 The prohibition on postprioritization algorithms, however, does not apply to advertisements or
content the platform is paid to carry.166
2.

Consistent Application of Standards

The provisions of this subsection require “[a] social media platform .
. . [to] publish the standards, including detailed definitions, it uses . . . [to]
determin[e] how to censor, deplatform, and shadow ban” a user.167 The social
media platform must apply those detailed standards “consistent[ly]” among
all users on the platform.168 Section 4 goes on to require “social media
platform[s] [to] inform each user about any changes to its user rules, terms,
and agreements before implementing the changes . . . .”169
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.

Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(d).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(f).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(b).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(e), (2)(h).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(f)(2).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(g).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(1)(e).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(a).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(b).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(2)(c).

2021]

FREEDOM OF SPEECH IN THE ERA OF SOCIAL MEDIA

3.

49

Damages

A private citizen can bring a cause of action against a social media
platform for violating this section, for failing to apply consistent censorship
standards among its users, or for shadow banning a user without notice. 170 The
remedy provides “$100,000 in statutory damages per . . . claim” along with
“actual damages,” “punitive damages”—"if aggravating factors are
present”—and “other forms of equitable relief”.171 Further, if the user was
deplatformed in a manner that is inconsistent with the detailed standards
required by section 4, then the user is entitled to “costs and reasonable attorney
fees.”172
IV.

THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SECTION 2 AND 4 OF SENATE BILL
7072

In analyzing the constitutionality of the regulation at issue, a court
must first determine if the speech is content-based or content-neutral, which
in turn, determines the appropriate standard of review.173 Laws that
distinguish favored speech from disfavored speech on the basis of the ideas or
views expressed are content-based and are subject to strict scrutiny.174 By
contrast, laws that confer benefits or impose burdens on speech without
reference to the ideas or views expressed are in most instances content-neutral
and are subject to intermediate scrutiny.175 Cases have recognized that even a
regulation neutral on its face may be content-based if its manifest purpose is
to regulate speech because of the message it conveys.176
A.

NetChoice v. Moody

Three days after SB 7072 was signed into law by Governor DeSantis,
NetChoice and CCIA sued to enjoin its enforcement.177 Count one of the
complaint alleged that SB 7072 violated the plaintiff’s First Amendment free
speech rights by interfering with the providers’ editorial judgment, compelling

170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.

Fla. S.B.7072; see FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6)(a)–(d).
Fla. S.B. 7072; FLA. STAT. § 501.2041(6)(e).
See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 637 (1994).
Id. at 642, 658.
Id. at 642.
See, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 315 (1990).
Kirkland, supra note 21; Fla. S.B. 7072.
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speech, and prohibiting speech.178 Count two alleged that SB 7072 was vague,
and therefore in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.179 Count three
claimed SB 7072 violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause by impermissibly discriminating between providers that do or do not
meet the bill’s size requirements.180 Count four alleged that SB 7072 violated
the Constitution’s Dormant Commerce Clause,181 and count five alleged that
the bill was preempted by federal statute, namely section 230 of the
Communications Decency Act.182
The discussion below will address the constitutionality of certain
provisions of sections 2 and 4 of the bill, which encompasses counts one and
five of the complaint.183 On June 30, 2021, the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Florida granted NetChoice and CCIA’s
preliminary injunction against SB 7072’s enforcement.184 Judge Robert
Hinkle’s order discussed the constitutionality of the provisions of SB 7072 to
assess whether there is a likelihood of success on the merits because it is one
of the elements a court must consider when issuing a preliminary injunction.185
Judge Hinkle noted that further factual developments may change the
analysis of the constitutionality of the challenged sections of the law and that
statements about the merits should be understood only as statements about the
likelihood of success.186
1.

Content-Based Restrictions

One of the first arguments the plaintiffs made was that SB 7072
violated the First Amendment’s Free Speech Clause.187 Specifically, sections
2 and 4 were alleged to “restrict speech based on its content and based on its
178.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 44–54; Fla. S.B. 7072.
179.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 55–58; Fla. S.B. 7072.
180.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 59–62; Fla. S.B. 7072.
181.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 62–64.
182.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 64–68.
183.
Fla. S.B. 7072; see discussion infra Sections IV.A.1–3.
184.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *12
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021); see also Fla. S.B. 7072.
185.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2; see also Fla. S.B. 7072; see, e.g.,
Charles H. Wesley Educ. Found., Inc. v. Cox, 408 F.3d 1349, 1354 (11th Cir. 2005)
As a prerequisite to a preliminary injunction, a plaintiff must establish a
substantial likelihood of success on the merits, that the plaintiff will suffer irreparable
injury if the injunction does not issue, that the threatened injury outweighs whatever
damage the proposed injunction may cause a defendant, and that the injunction will
not be adverse to the public interest.

NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2.
186.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *2.
187.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45; Fla. S.B. 7072.
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speaker . . . .”188 The plaintiffs contended that SB 7072, namely section 4,
“authorizes the State to engage in highly intrusive investigations of content
moderation processes and judgments, . . . ” which requires detailed
explanations of the algorithms used to censor political candidates.189 Because
both these provisions are content-based, the plaintiffs argued they are subject
to strict scrutiny.190 The plaintiffs claimed that neither section survives strict
scrutiny because the government has no legitimate interest that supports
sections 2 and 4’s constraints, let alone a compelling interest.191
In the preliminary injunction, the court agreed with the plaintiffs,
noting that “[t]he Florida Statutes at issue are about as content-based as it
gets.”192 First, Florida Statute section 106.072 only applies to the
deplatforming of political candidates, no one else.193 This, the court writes, is
a content-based restriction.194 Second, the court points to the factual support
asserted by the plaintiffs of the actual motivation for the legislation, which
“was hostility to the social media platforms’ perceived liberal viewpoint.”195
According to the complaint, the plaintiffs claimed that the core goal
of SB 7072 was to “punish the targeted companies because the Legislature
and Governor dislike[d] the perceived political and ideological viewpoints
that those private businesses supposedly express[ed] through their content
judgments.”196 The order quotes the Lieutenant Governor, who said:
‘What we’ve been seeing across the U.S. is an effort to silence,
intimidate, and wipe out dissenting voices by the leftist media and
big corporations . . . . Thankfully in Florida we have a Governor
that fights against big tech oligarchs that contrive, manipulate, and
censor if you voice views that run contrary to their radical leftist
narrative.’197

188.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45; Fla. S.B. 7072.
189.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19; Fla. S.B. 7072.
190.
Id.; see Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding
Content-Based Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 285 (2009).
191.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 45. (“Because the State has no
legitimate —much less compelling— governmental interest that supports these provisions, and
because none of the provisions are narrowly tailored, they do not survive strict scrutiny. Indeed,
they would fail under any standard of review.”); see Fla. S.B. 7072.
192.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
193.
Id.
194.
Id.
195.
Id.
196.
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 50; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
197.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10.
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The State could not assert a justification for the law, and the court
contended that leveling the playing field by promoting speech on one side of
an issue, or restricting speech on the other, was not a legitimate state
interest.198 According to the court, because the law was clearly motivated by
the content of the speech, strict scrutiny applied, and the government’s
asserted reason, or lack of reason, for the legislation was neither legitimate
nor compelling.199
2.

Compelled Speech

Next, the plaintiffs asserted that SB 7072 compels speech by forcing
the private social media platforms to carry content that the companies would
not otherwise host.200 The plaintiffs argued that they have a right to choose
what to post on their platforms and section 4 of SB 7072 directly infringed on
their protected editorial ability to do so.201 The plaintiffs cited three cases to
support their argument: (1) Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo;202 (2)
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc.;203
and (3) Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (“PG&E”) v. Public Utilities Commission
of California.204 In Tornillo, the Supreme Court struck down a Florida law
that required newspapers to offer candidates a right to reply to the newspapers’
published criticisms of candidates.205 The Supreme Court held that this was a
form of compelled speech which infringed on the publishers’ editorial
freedom, and was therefore unconstitutional.206
Similarly, in Hurley, the Irish-American Gay, Lesbian, and Bisexual
Group of Boston (“GLIB”) challenged a decision of the South Boston Allied
War Veterans Council (“Veterans Council”) that denied GLIB the opportunity
to walk in an annual parade organized by the Veterans Council as being a
violation of Massachusetts’ public accommodations law.207 The Veterans
Council claimed that including GLIB in their parade would contravene what
the association was attempting to communicate.208 The Supreme Court held
198.
Id. at *11; see also Arizona Free Enter. Club’s Freedom Club PAC v.
Bennett, 564 U.S. 721, 749 (2011).
199.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *10.
200.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 46; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
201.
See NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19, at 2–3.
202.
418 U.S. 241 (1974).
203.
515 U.S. 557 (1995).
204.
475 U.S. 1 (1986); see also NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *7–*8.
205.
See Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 256–57.
206.
See id. at 258.
207.
Hurley, 515 U.S. at 561.
208.
Id. at 562–63.
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that the Veterans Council had a First Amendment right to exclude GLIB from
the parade because a state may not require a private group to include a group
whose message the organizers do not wish to promote.209 Lastly, the
legislation being challenged in PG&E required a private utility company to
include newsletters from other organizations that held differing views from
those of PG&E in their billing envelopes.210 The Supreme Court held this
legislation to be unconstitutional because it was a form of compelled
speech.211
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida
found that these three cases established that a “private party that creates or
uses its editorial judgment to select content for publication cannot be required
by the government to also publish content with which [they] disagree[d]” or
would not otherwise publish.212 Further, the court noted that social media
providers’ editorial process was different than those of the cases cited, in that
the social media providers post material invisibly.213 Algorithms do much of
the sorting of the content posted by third parties, as opposed to the social
media providers doing the sifting themselves, like a traditional publisher
would.214
The State offers two cases in support of their legislation: (1) Rumsfeld
v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc.215 and (2) PruneYard
Shopping Center v. Robins.216 In Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court upheld a
Federal statute that conditioned law schools’ receipt of Federal funds on
allowing military recruiters access to the school’s campus.217 The Court found
that this was conduct, not speech; thus, the Federal law was not compelling
the law school to adhere to the military’s speech, but rather, they were simply
opening their doors to the recruiters.218 Similarly, in PruneYard, the Supreme
Court found no First Amendment violation when the California Supreme
Court upheld students’ right to peacefully solicit signatures in a private
209.
See id. at 575–76. (“[W]hatever the reason, it boils down to the choice of a
speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that choice is presumed to lie beyond
the government’s power to control.”).
210.
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 15–16
(1986).
211.
Id. at 20–21.
212.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
213.
Id.
214.
See id.; see discussion supra Section II.B.2.
215.
547 U.S. 47 (2006).
216.
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
217.
F. for Acad. & Inst. Rts., Inc., 547 U.S. 51, 70 (2006).
218.
Id. at 56–57.
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shopping mall that removed the students from the premises because the
students were violating PruneYard’s regulations that forbade their conduct.219
The Northern District Court of Florida, in ruling on NetChoice and
CCIA’s preliminary injunction, noted that the cases raised by the State only
established that:
[C]ompelling a person to allow a visitor access to the person’s
property, for the purpose of speaking, is not a First Amendment
violation, so long as the person is not compelled to speak, the person
is not restricted from speaking, and the message of the visitor is not
likely to be attributed to the person.220

SB 7072 is different, the court concluded, because it explicitly forbids
social media platforms from adding their own statements, such as warnings to
posts by other users and compelling speech by requiring the social media
platforms to arrange their material in a certain way.221
3.

Preemption

The plaintiffs also assert that SB 7072 is preempted by section 230 of
the Communications Decency Act, and the Florida District Court agreed.222
As noted above, section 230 provides a legal shield for interactive computer
services—social media platforms—for “[any] action voluntarily taken in good
faith to restrict to or availability of material that the provider or user considers
[to be] obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable, whether or not such material is constitutionally
protected . . . .”223 Thus, social media providers will likewise not be held liable
for action taken to restrict access to material described above.224
According to the Florida District Court, because section 4 of SB 7072
explicitly imposes a daily fine for deplatforming a candidate and gives private
citizens statutory damages for shadow banning them, SB 7072 contravenes
section 230.225 The Federal statute also explicitly states that “[n]o cause of
219.
PruneYard Shopping Ctr., 447 U.S. at 88.
220.
NetChoice, LLC v. Moody, No. 21-CV-220, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9
(N.D. Fla. June 30, 2021).
221.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *9; S.B. 7072, 27th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess.
(Fla. 2021).
222.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at at *6; NetChoice Complaint, supra note
19, at 67–68; Fla. S.B. 7072; 47 U.S.C. § 230.
223.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A); see discussion supra Section II.B; NetChoice,
2021 WL 2690876, at *6.
224.
47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B); see discussion supra Section II.B.
225.
Fla. S.B. 7072; 47 U.S.C. § 230; see NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6.
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action may be brought and no liability may be imposed under any State or
local law that is inconsistent with this section.”226 The District Court found
that the plaintiffs are likely to prevail on their challenge of the preempted
provisions of SB 7072.227
V.

CONCLUSION

The Florida District Court’s discussion of the constitutionality of SB
7072 was only to assess the likelihood of success on the merits as part of the
ruling on the preliminary injunction.228 With further discovery, it may be
found that these social media companies are not actually removing and
regulating content on their platforms in good faith, which would affect their
legal immunity.229 Governor DeSantis fully expected a challenge to SB 7072
and filed a Notice of Appeal of the District Court’s decision on July 12,
2021.230 Texas, Louisiana, and North Carolina have recently passed laws
similar to Florida’s SB 7072.231
One of the arguments that the defendants may raise on appeal is the
invisible editorial process.232 The District Court notes that social media
platforms are different from traditional publishers in that they do not sort and
sift through the material, rather they use algorithms to conduct this editorial
feature.233 If social media companies are creating the algorithmic equations
to sort out certain material, however, then there is an argument that such
invisible editing is actually manufactured to remove and filter material
outlined by the companies and codified in their algorithms.234
Many of the District Court’s decisions pertaining to the
constitutionality of SB 7072 will likely be upheld because certain provisions

226.
47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(3).
227.
NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *6; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
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2021 WL 2690876, at *1; see Fla. S.B. 7072.
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Debra Kaufman, Federal Judge Blocks Florida Law That Restricts Social
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See discussion supra Section IV.A.2; NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
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See discussion supra Section IV.A.2; NetChoice, 2021 WL 2690876, at *8.
234.
See Chris Meserole, How Misinformation Spreads on Social Media — and
What to Do About It, BROOKINGS (May 9, 2018), http://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-fromchaos/2018/05/09/how-misinformation-spreads-on-social-media-and-what-to-do-about-it/.
After Twitter moved away from chronological feeds in 2016, they incorporated algorithmic
feeds, which sort material that the user would find most relevant. Id.
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seem to be a clear case of the government interfering with private speech.235
Presumably, Governor DeSantis thought it necessary to act when Congress
did not.236 Calls to reform section 230 are mounting from both sides of the
political spectrum.237 Federal government officials have discussed potential
regulatory intervention, legislative reform, and amending or even dispensing
section 230 entirely.238 Even Justice Clarence Thomas has commented on the
expansive scope of section 230 immunity and how it has exceeded its initial
intended goal.239
One legislative proposal to change section 230 is the Eliminating
Abusive and Rampant Neglect of Interactive Technologies Act (“EARN IT
Act”).240 Proposed in early March 2020 and sponsored by bipartisan
legislators, the EARN IT Act would change section 230 by exempting “‘child
exploitation law’” from its scope of immunity.241
The EARN IT Act proposes to remove section 230 immunity for
challenges brought by minors who were victims of sexual abuse material
posted on social media platforms.242 Critics of the EARN IT Act claim the act
violates the First and Fourth Amendments of the Constitution by
impermissibly regulating online platforms’ editorial activity and allowing
online platforms to engage in government action by searching users’ accounts
without a warrant based on probable cause.243
Other proposed legislation to curtail section 230 immunity includes,
“‘Stop the Censorship Act of 2020,’”244 “‘Online Freedom and Viewpoint
235.
See discussion supra Part IV; Fla. S.B. 7072.
236.
See Ryan Mrazik & Natasha Amlani, Cover Story Section 230: A Law on
the Cusp of Change?, ANTITRUST, Fall 2020, at 26, 27–28 (discussing the various bills the
legislature has proposed to curtail section 230, but that have not “progressed meaningfully”);
NetChoice Complaint, supra note 19 at 3–5.
237.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 26.
238.
Id.; Chris Riley & David Morar, Legislative Efforts and Policy Frameworks
Within the Section 230 Debate, BROOKINGS TECHSTREAM (Sept. 21, 2021),
http://www.brookings.edu/techstream/legislative-efforts-and-policy-frameworks-within-thesection-230-debate/.
239.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 26; Malwarebytes, Inc. v. Enigma
Software Grp. USA, LLC, 141 S. Ct. 13, 13 (2020).
240.
See Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27–28; S. 3398, 116th Cong. § 3
(2020).
241.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27; see S. 3398.
242.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 27; see S. 3398.
243.
Sophia Cope et al., The EARN IT Act Violates the Constitution, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Mar. 31, 2020), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2020/03/earn-it-act-violatesconstitution; S. 3398.
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Republican Congressman Paul Gosar. Id.; H.R. 4027, 116th Cong. (2019).
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Diversity Act,’”245 “‘Stopping Big Tech’s Censorship Act,’”246 “‘Limiting
Section 230 Immunity to Good Samaritans Act,’”247 and “‘Ending Support for
Internet Censorship Act.’”248 None of these bills have progressed as far as the
EARN IT Act, but they are all aimed at what the representative sponsors
believe to be politically biased removal and censorship of content by social
media providers.249
Another approach worth noting is one proposed by Justice Clarence
Thomas in his concurring opinion in Biden v. Knight First Amendment
Institute at Columbia University.250 Justice Thomas suggests that the
doctrines that limit the right of a private company to exclude might be the
proper avenue to combat Big Tech’s centralized control on communication,
as opposed to First Amendment grounds.251 One such doctrine is the treatment
of certain large, private entities as common carriers, like communication and
transportation providers.252 In exchange for regulating these industries,
federal and state governments have given these massive industries special
government favors, such as liability immunity from suit.253 Similarly, section
230 already grants Big Tech civil immunity from suit; however, serious
regulation of these tech industries is missing.254
Justice Thomas also suggests that public accommodation laws are
another avenue in which the government has limited a company’s right to
exclude.255 Digital platforms may be subject to public accommodation laws
because of the services they provide to the general public at large.256 The
Legislature may choose to treat Big Tech companies as public
accommodations, making them susceptible to anti-discrimination laws such
that digital platforms deal with consumers equally.257 Justice Thomas notes,
245.
Mrazik & Amlani, supra note 236, at 28. Legislation proposed by
Republican Senator Roger Wicker. Id.; S. 4534, 116th Cong. § 1 (2020).
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however, that the change would be better served coming from Congress.258
Nonetheless, these are two arguments that potential plaintiffs may soon
assert.259
Whichever approach the legislature ultimately decides to take, it is
evident that Big Tech is affecting the dissemination of speech in the United
States, and the rest of the world.260 Many argue that allowing social media
companies free reign to remove, silence, and otherwise edit content with
impunity requires oversight.261 SB 7072 will likely be struck down as
unconstitutional, but that does not mean that Americans cannot act by voting
for candidates that fight for a marketplace of ideas that is open and robust with
debate in search of the truth.262 In the words of Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
Jr., “the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in
the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which
their wishes safely can be carried out.”263 Holmes continues, “[t]hat at any
rate is the theory of our Constitution. It is an experiment, as all life is an
experiment. Every year if not every day we have to wager our salvation upon
some prophecy based upon imperfect knowledge.”264
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